We investigate the price of selfish routing in non-cooperative networks in terms of the coordination and bicriteria ratios in the recently introduced game theoretic network model of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou. We present the first thorough study of this model for general, monotone families of cost functions and for cost functions from Queueing Theory. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
• We show that an unbounded coordination ratio implies additionally an extremely high performance degradation under bicriteria measures. We demonstrate that the price of selfish routing can be as high as a bandwidth degradation by a factor that is linear in the network size.
• We separate the game theoretic (integral) allocation model from the (fractional) flow model by demonstrating that even a very small, in fact negligible, amount of integrality can lead to a dramatic performance degradation.
• We unify recent results on selfish routing under different objectives by showing that an unbounded coordination ratio under the min-max objective implies an unbounded coordination ratio under the average-cost (or total-latency) objective and vice versa.
Our special focus lies on cost functions describing the behavior of Web servers that can open only a limited number of TCP connections. In particular, we compare the performance of queueing systems that serve all incoming requests with servers that reject requests in case of overload.
INTRODUCTION
In large-scale communication networks, like the Internet, it is usually impossible to globally manage network traffic. In the absence of global control it is therefore a reasonable assumption in traffic modeling that network users follow the most rational approach, that is, they behave selfishly to optimize their own individual welfare. This motivates the analysis of network traffic using models from Game Theory in which each player is aware of the situation facing all other players and tries to minimize its cost. Under these assumptions, the routing process should arrive into a socalled Nash equilibrium in which no network user has an incentive to change its strategy.
It is well known (and easy to see) that Nash equilibria do not always optimize the overall performance of the system. Therefore, in order to understand the phenomenon of non-cooperative systems Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [14] initiated investigations of the coordination ratio, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social (i.e., overall) optimum. In other words, this analysis seeks the price of uncoordinated selfish decisions ("the price of anarchy"). Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [14, 19] proposed to investigate the coordination ratio for routing problems in which a set of agents is sending traffic along a set of parallel links with linear cost functions.
In this paper, we generalize the model of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou towards more realistic cost functions. Our main focus is on a specific example in which parallel links are the natural choice: we investigate the effects of selfish behavior on a Web server farm. Suppose some companies maintain a set of servers distributed all over the world and offer content providers to store data for them. Such servers could store, e.g., large pictures and other embedded files, since this kind of data makes up most of the load. The request streams that would normally go to the servers of the content provider must now be redirected to these new Web servers. Clearly, this defines a load balancing problem in which streams must be mapped to the servers such that a high quality of service can be guaranteed for every stream. Important aspects that have to be taken into account is that different streams might have different characteristics, e.g., caused by different file lengths. For practical studies that investigate the reasons and impacts of this variability in traffic see, e.g., [2, 4, 5, 22, 23] .
In nowadays server farms the mapping of data streams to servers is typically done by a centralized or distributed algorithm that is under control of the provider of the server farm. We can imagine, however, that such a service can be offered in a completely different way without global control. For example, each stream of requests is managed by a selfish agent (e.g., the content provider) that decides to which server the stream is directed. In this case, every agent would aim to minimize its own cost, e.g., the expected latency experienced by the requests in the stream or the fraction of requests that are rejected.
In this paper, we present the first thorough study of coordination and bicriteria ratios under more realistic cost functions. In previous works on traffic analysis in networks, it has been typically assumed that every data stream is completely described by a single rate. In some of our investigations we will make this assumption, too. In order to incorporate the variability of traffic, however, we will additionally study selfish routing under more complex cost functions that take into account different session length distributions. In fact, we will consider general distributions for session lengths. We further distinguish between homogeneous traffic in which all streams have the same session length distribution and heterogeneous traffic in which different streams might have different session length distributions.
Definition of the Routing Problem
The routing problem described above can be formally defined as an assignment problem with n data streams and m servers (or parallel links). The set of streams is denoted by [n] = {1, . . . , n} and the set of servers is denoted by [m] = {1, . . . , m}. The data streams shall be mapped to the servers such that a cost function (describing, e.g., waiting or service times) is minimized. We aim at comparing the assignment obtained by selfish agents with a minmax optimal assignment.
A server farm is a set of m servers, all using the same policy to serve requests. Different servers, however, may have different bandwidths. Let b j denote the bandwidth of server j.
Data streams are infinite sequences of requests for service (to the server farm). These sequences are assumed to be of a stochastic nature. For simplicity, we make a standard assumption that requests are issued by a large number of independent users and hence they arrive with Poisson distribution. Let r i denote the injection rate of data stream i. For the lengths of the sessions, however, we allow general probability distributions. In particular, we assume the session length of stream i is determined by an arbitrary probability distribution D i . We define the weight of stream i to be
We distinguish between fractional and integral assignments of data streams to the servers. In an integral assignment, every stream must be assigned to exactly one server. The mapping is described by an assignment matrix X = (x Typically, we will assume B = R >0 or B = N >0 , but occasionally we will study finite domains of bandwidth. For example, a collection of identical servers with some specified bandwidth b is formally described by a family of cost functions F B with B = {b}.
The load of a server j under an assignment X is defined by
and the cost of server j is defined by
Unless otherwise stated, we consider the routing problem with respect to the min-max objective. That is, we assume an optimal assignment minimizes the maximum cost over all servers:
We note here, that in the definition of opt the minimization is over all matrices X that are either integral (in the case of integral assignments) or fractional (in the case of fractional assignments). This distinction will be clear from the context.
Preliminaries in Game Theory
Integral assignments and Nash equilibria. We assume the decision about the assignment of a data stream i ∈ [n] to a server is performed by an agent i who uses certain strategy to assign its data stream. Game Theory distinguishes between mixed and pure strategies. The set of pure strategies for agent i ∈ [n] is [m] , that is, a pure strategy maps every stream to exactly one server and hence can be described by an integral assignment matrix X . A mixed strategy is defined to be a probability distribution over pure strategies. In particular, the probability that agent i maps its stream to server j is denoted by p j i .
Observe that under these assumptions the load w j and the cost C j of server j are random variables wrt. the probabilities p
For a stream i, let us define the expected cost of stream i on server j by c
Recall that our objective is to minimize the maximum cost over all servers. Therefore, we define the social cost of a mixed assignment by
If selfish players aim to minimize their individual cost, then the resulting (possible mixed) assignment is in Nash equilibrium, that is, p . In other words, a Nash equilibrium is characterized by the property that there is no incentive for any task to change its strategy.
Coordination and bicriteria ratios. The coordination ratio for a fixed set of servers and streams is defined by max
C opt
, where the maximum is over all Nash equilibria. Thus, the coordination ratio specifies how many times the cost can increase due to selfish behavior. The coordination ratio R over a family of cost functions F B is defined to be the maximum coordination ratio over all possible sets of streams and servers with cost functions from F B . Typically R is described by an asymptotic function in m.
In our study, we will identify several instances of cost functions for which R is unbounded. In this case, we will investigate bicriteria characteristics of the system. Let opt Γ denote the value of an optimal solution over pure strategies assuming that all the injection rates r i are increased by a factor of Γ. Then, the bicriteria ratio R is defined to be the smallest Γ satisfying C ≤ opt Γ over all Nash equilibria. In other words, the bicriteria ratio describes how many times the injected rates (the amount of traffic in the system) must be decreased so that the worst-case cost in Nash equilibrium cannot exceed the optimal cost for the original rates.
Fractional assignments and selfish flow. The motivation to consider fractional assignments is to assume that every stream consists of infinitely many units each carrying an infinitesimal (and thus negligible) amount of flow (traffic). Each such a unit behaves in a selfish way. Intuitively, we expect each unit to be assigned (selfishly) to a server promising minimum cost, taking into account the behavior of other units of flow. Assuming infinitesimal small units of flow, we come to the following fractional variant of the integral assignment model. (This fractional model has been frequently considered in the literature, see, e.g., [8, 24, 25, 26, 27] ).
The fractional model does not distinguish between mixed and pure strategies. There are several equivalent ways to define a Nash equilibrium in this model. We use the characterization of Wardrop [29] , see also [24] . A fractional assignment is in Nash equilibrium if
The coordination ratio is defined analogously to the integral assignment model, and the coordination ratio over a family of cost functions is denoted by R * .
Previous Research
The game theoretical integral assignment model for server farms (or parallel links) as described above, has been introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [14] . Their focus is on the integral assignment model and linear cost functions, that is, functions of the
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou give first results for the coordination ratio in this model (e.g., tight bounds on the coordination ratio for two links). These results have been later largely extended in [3, 13, 16] , and in particular, tight bounds in this model are established by Czumaj and Vöcking in [3] . We are not aware of any results for non-linear cost functions in this model.
Roughgarden and Tardos [24] study the cost of selfish routing in a general network model, where the streams may be required to be routed through a network from given sources to given destinations. They focus mainly on the fractional flow model making the assumption that each stream consists of infinitely many units, each of which behaves in a selfish way. The traffic network parameter to be minimized is the weighted average-cost over all streams instead of the min-max cost over all servers. (We will discuss this objective function in a more detail in Section 2.5.) They showed that when the cost functions of the edges are linear then the average cost in a Nash equilibrium is at most 4 3 times the average cost in an optimal routing. For arbitrary nondecreasing and continuous cost functions, they show the existence of Nash equilibria whose total cost may be arbitrarily larger than the average cost in an optimal routing. On the other hand, they give a bicriteria result that the average cost in Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by the average cost in an optimal routing for twice the amount of flow. The same objective function has been investigated recently by Friedman [8] , who studied how the amount of flow influences the bicriteria ratio under cost functions from Queueing Theory.
Besides the selfish flow, Roughgarden and Tardos [24] consider also integral assignments. They give an example of a network with an unbounded bicriteria ratio. They present also a sufficient condition under which the bicriteria ratio is bounded by a certain function: they prove that the bicriteria ratio is upper bounded by α 2−α if data streams are so small that adding any stream to any server increases the total cost at most by a factor of α, where α ≤ 2. This condition is restricted to pure assignments only. Furthermore, they remark that a useful application of this condition requires families of cost functions with f b (0) > γ, for any b > 0 and a fixed γ > 0.
Outline
Our new results are presented in the following two sections. In Section 2, we will focus on general, monotone cost functions. In Section 3, we will consider families of cost functions from Queueing Theory. Section 4 contains conclusions. In order to have space for a comprehensive discussion of our results, the technical part containing the proofs is moved to the Appendix. (Missing proofs of Theorems 9 and 11 will appear in the full version.)
MONOTONE FAMILIES OF COST FUNCTIONS
A cost function f is called simple if it depends only on the injected load, that is, if the cost of a server is a function of the sum of the weights mapped to the server but does not depend on other characteristics like, e.g., the session length distribution. (This is a typical assumption in previous works.) A simple cost function is called monotone if it is non-negative, continuous, and nondecreasing. For an ordered set B, a family of simple cost functions F B is called monotone if (i) f b is monotone for every b ∈ B and (ii) the cost functions are non-increasing in
Fractional assignments
Our first result is that all monotone cost functions behave very well under fractional assignments. Recall that R * denotes the coordination ratio for fractional assignments. This result follows almost directly from the definition of Nash equilibria specifying that all servers with positive flow at Nash equilibrium must have same cost, which under monotone cost functions implies that all Nash equilibria have the same social cost C = opt (see, e.g., [24, Lemma 2.5]). The observation separates coordination ratios for the min-max objective investigated by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [14] from ratios for the averagecost objective by Roughgarden and Tardos [24] and Friedman [8] (see also Section 2.5). In sharp contrast to Observation 1, the results in [8, 14] show that there exist instances of fractional flow on parallel links in which the average-cost coordination ratio is unbounded [24] . This shows that the average-cost and min-max objective can differ arbitrarily under general, monotone cost functions. In the context that we consider here, that of server farms, the min-max objective seems to be the natural choice as it guarantees fairness and efficiency simultaneously.
Integral assignments
Now let us consider the integral assignment model. We say a coordination ratio R over a family of cost functions F B is bounded if for every m and every server farm with m servers with cost functions from F B there exists Γ > 0 such that for every set of streams the value of the worst-case Nash equilibrium is at most Γ·opt. (Observe that Γ might depend on m. Thus, bounded means bounded by a function in m.) Otherwise, the coordination ratio is unbounded. Our first result is an exact characterization of those monotone families of cost functions for which the coordination ratio is bounded.
THEOREM 2. The coordination ratio R over a monotone family F B of cost functions is bounded if and only if
Notice that this characterization of bounded vs. unbounded coordination ratios can be applied also to server farms with identical servers. (Recall that such farms are described by families of cost functions consisting only of a single cost function.)
Clearly, for every family of monotone cost functions one can identify a minimum α ∈ R ≥1 ∪{∞} fulfilling the conditions specified in the theorem. A natural question is, how does the coordination ratio depend on this minimum α? -In fact, our analysis (see the proof of Theorem 2 and Lemma 14) shows that the coordination ratio is at most m O(log α) . Observe, if the family of cost functions F B is assumed to be fixed, then α is a constant or infinity. Thus, we can conclude that for every fixed family of cost functions the coordination ratio is either unbounded or it is polynomially bounded in the number of servers, m.
Let us illustrate the power of the above theorem by investigating some examples. First, we consider families over polynomial cost functions, i.e., functions of the form k r=0 a r · λ r , for a fixed k ≥ 0. For these families we can pick α = a k · 2 k to conclude that here the coordination ratio is bounded. In contrast, there is no such α for exponential cost functions, i.e., cost functions for which an additive increase in the load leads to a multiplicative increase in the cost.
COROLLARY 3. The coordination ratio R for server farms with polynomial cost functions is bounded, whereas the coordination ratio for server farms of (possibly identical) servers with exponential cost functions is unbounded.
In the next sections we shall discuss several other, practically motivated examples of families of cost functions with unbounded coordination ratios based on well-known formulas from Queueing Theory. We want to point out that unbounded coordination ratios are not only a special phenomenon of cost functions having a pole or an unbounded first derivative. Later in the paper, we will see a practical example of a family of cost functions (based on the Erlang loss formula) that has an unbounded coordination ratio although the functions in this family as well as their first derivatives are bounded above by a small constant, namely one.
Integral assignments with negligible weights
If we compare the results in Observation 1 and Theorem 2 then we come to the conclusion that integrality can lead to a dramatic performance degradation. As mentioned before, the fractional flow model is assumed to be a simplification that aims to model the situation in which each stream carries only a negligible fraction of the total load [24] . Therefore, let us investigate the relationship between fractional flow and integral assignments of streams with tiny weights more closely. For this purpose we define the notion of " -small streams." For a server farm with identical servers we have the following simple definition. Stream i is called -small if
that is, the stream has at most an m -fraction of the overall weight. In the case of servers with different bandwidths, we use the following, slightly more technical definition. Let us fix a server farm and a set of streams with positive weights. Let opt * denote the minimum maximum cost over all fractional assignments. For a stream i ∈ [n], define the scaled stream i to be a stream with rate r i = r i / and session length distribution D i = D i . (Observe that this implies that the weight of the scaled stream is λ i = λ i / .) Then stream i is called -small if, for every j ∈ [m], the cost of server j is at most opt * when this server gets assigned the scaled stream i and no other stream. Now, we define R to be the worst-case coordination ratio under the restriction that all streams are -small.
THEOREM 4. Given any monotone family of cost functions F B . For every > 0, the coordination ratio R over -small streams is bounded if and only if the coordination ratio R is bounded.
A motivation for considering fractional flow instead of integral assignments is that these two models are sometimes assumed to be "essentially equivalent," see, e.g., Remark 2.3 in [24] . Theorem 4 disproves this equivalence for general cost functions. It implies, that there are cost functions with lim →0 R = R = ∞ and R * = 1. Moreover, the instances proving the characterization of unbounded coordination ratios use only pure strategies. Hence, even pure assignments with negligible weights are different from fractional flow.
Integral assignments under bicriteria measures
It is not surprising that selfish routing can lead to a dramatic cost increase when the cost function has an ∞-pole. In principle, bicriteria measures can be much more informative as they in some sense filter out the extreme behavior of such cost functions at the pole. The following theorem, however, shows that an unbounded coordination ratio R implies a very poor worst-case behavior under bicriteria measures as well. Recall that R denotes the bicriteria ratio over integral assignments, that is, R specifies by how much the injected rates must be increased to ensure that the worst-case cost in Nash equilibrium will not exceed the optimal cost for the increased rates. The example proving this bad ratio is a server farm of identical servers. In fact, for the case of identical servers one can easily show that a bicriteria ratio of m is the worst possible. This is because a Nash equilibrium cannot be worse than mapping all streams to the same server, and the cost of this extremely unbalanced solution is bounded above by an optimal assignment for an instance with all weights blown up by a factor of m.
Min-max versus average-cost objective functions
Besides the min-max objective function investigated above, we study also the average-cost (or total latency) objective function that has been investigated by Roughgarden and Tardos [24] (see also, e.g., [6, 28] for related results). This objective function aims at minimizing the expected weighted average cost over all streams. Formally, the cost under this objective function is defined by
and the social optimum is defined by
where λ = i∈ [n] λ i is the total injected weight and the minimum is taken over all integral assignment matrices. These definitions are equivalent to the respective definitions in the Roughgarden-Tardos model [24] when normalizing λ to one. We can consider various coordination ratios for the average-cost objective function similarly as for the min-max objective function. These average-cost coordination ratios are defined in the same way as for the min-max model considered before, the only difference is that now one compares the average cost in Nash equilibrium with the average-cost optimum.
THEOREM 6. In the case of integral assignments, the averagecost objective leads to exactly the same characterizations for coordination and bicriteria ratios as those given in the Theorems 2, 4 and 5 for the min-max objective.
We want to point out that this equivalence is non-trivial. In general, the behavior under the two objective functions can be quite different. For example, as described in the discussion below Observation 1, in case of fractional assignments, the coordination ratios can be completely opposite under average-cost and min-max objective functions.
COST FUNCTIONS FROM QUEUEING THEORY
A typical example of a monotone family of cost functions that is derived from the formula for the expected system time (delay) on an M/M/1 server with injection rate λ and service rate b, namely
. Already Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in their seminal work [14] ask for the price of selfish routing under cost functions of this form. Our characterization of bounded and unbounded coordination ratios given in Theorem 2 immediately implies that the integral coordination ratios for this family of functions are unbounded, which answers the open question from [14] . Of course, this is only one particular example for cost functions from Queueing Theory. Selfish Routing under similar functions have been widely studied, e.g., in [11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20] . We want to have a closer look at such functions in various server farm models.
We distinguish two general kinds of servers in server farms. A parallel server has multiple service channels. Each service channel can serve a session independently from other channels. The number of channels on server j corresponds to its bandwidth b j and all channels serve requests with the same service rate one. Thus, the time a channel needs to serve a session is equal to the length of the session. (Recall that the session lengths in stream i are determined by a probability distribution D i .) For example, the number of channels may correspond to the number of TCP connections that are allowed to be opened simultaneously on a Web server. In contrast, a sequential server has only one service channel. This channel works at service rate b j . Thus, the time a channel needs to serve a session is equal to the length of the session divided by b j . We will consider both farms of parallel servers and farms of sequential servers.
Another important aspect that leads to different cost functions is what happens in case of overload. Again, we distinguish two extreme variants, namely, queueing and rejection. In the queuing model, every server maintains an FCFS queue in which it inserts requests when all available channels are in use by other requests. When a service channel finishes a session and the queue is nonempty the server immediately starts serving the next request in the queue. (All channels on the same server share the same queue.) In this model, the objective is to minimize the maximum expected delay. In the rejection model, blocked requests are rejected and disappear from the system. A natural objective in this model is to minimize the number of rejected requests and hence the cost function should describe the fraction of rejected requests.
Using the standard notation from Queueing Theory, a server with k channels that queues requests in case of overload corresponds to a so-called M/D/k/∞ or short M/D/k process, where D corresponds to the service time (session length) distribution of the injected request stream. When requests are rejected then the server is described by a so-called M/D/k/k process. . This assumption is motivated by the fact that the expected waiting time as well as the expected system time in every queueing process without rejection goes to infinity when the injection rate approaches the service rate (or bandwidth) of the server. Clearly, an immediate consequence of the ∞-pole is that the parameter α introduced in Theorem 2 is ∞. Thus, by Observation 1 and Theorems 2 and 5, we obtain the following corollary. The proof for this negative result uses a Nash equilibrium in which all streams are identical and the total injected load i∈ [n] λ i is less than the bandwidth of a single server. Thus, selfish routing can lead to a catastrophic performance degradation even under bicriteria measures in extremely lightly loaded cases.
Queueing systems without rejection
Recall that the instances proving the unbounded coordination ratio R are constructed using only pure strategies. However, the bad instances for the bicriteria ratio R that we have seen until now use mixed strategies. This motivates us to investigate whether the randomness introduced due to the choice of mixed strategies is the only source of troubles under bicriteria measures. The following theorem demonstrates that bicriteria ratios can also be poor in case of pure strategies only. . If we assume the cost function for waiting time then the theorem implies a bicriteria ratio over pure strategies of Ω(m 1/3 ). Similarly, for system time the bicriteria ratio is Ω(m 1/2 ). In both cases, the total injected load in the example that gives these bad results is very small. We investigate this closer, and show that the Ω(m 1/3 ) bound for M/M/1 waiting time is essentially tight, proving the following theorem. Summarizing, even for pure strategies and under a small total injection rate, the slowdown due to the lack of coordination can be dramatic.
An alternative bicriteria measure. For the family of monotone queueing functions there is another interesting bicriteria measure. It is a very natural question to ask by how much one has to decrease the bandwidths of the servers such that an optimal assignment under the decreased bandwidths is at least as expensive as a Nash equilibrium for the original system. Let R bw denote the corresponding worst-case bicriteria ratio. It turns out that for most functions from Queueing Theory, the effect of changing the bandwidths is larger than the effect of changing the injection rate. In fact, most of these functions show superlinear scaling, i.e., f b (λ) ≤ 
Queueing under heterogeneous traffic
Until now we implicitly assumed homogeneous traffic, i.e., all streams have the same (general) session length distribution. However, several practical studies show that Internet traffic is far away from being homogeneous, see, e.g., [2, 5, 22] . Following these studies, one has to take into account different session lengths distributions.
The Pollaczek-Khinchin (P-K) formula (see, e.g., [10] ) describes expected waiting time in M/G/1 queues, that is, the expected delay of requests on sequential servers under heterogeneous traffic with arbitrary service time distributions. We can use this formula and transform it into a family of cost functions depending only on two parameters, namely, the weight λ and the variance V , of the combined streams injected into server. Let us describe this in a more detail. Suppose every stream i is characterized by two weights λ i and V i corresponding to the expected load (i.e., the number of bytes requested per unit of time) and the variance of the load. Then, the P-K cost function family F R >0 can be defined as follows:
The remarkable fact here is that both parameters, the expected load and the variance, can be aggregated independently in a simple linear fashion. That is, the expected load injected into the server is λ = n i=1 λ i x i and the variance of this load is
Observe that if we assume λ i = V i then we are back in the homogeneous model with identical session length distribution and we obtain a monotone queueing function with only one parameter, λ. Consequently R = ∞ and R ≥ m for the P-K cost function family. In the fractional flow model, however, we will come to different results. Recall that R * = 1 under homogeneous traffic.
THEOREM 11. The coordination ratio R * for the P-K cost function family under heterogeneous traffic is unbounded. If the ratio between the bandwidth of the fastest and slowest server is restricted to be at most S then
We conclude that the optimality of fractional flow in Nash equilibrium is a special property of homogeneous traffic on parallel links, and hence one must take into account the heterogeneous nature of Web traffic when studying the price of selfish routing in the Internet.
Servers with parallel channels and rejection
Until now, we assumed that all requests are served, regardless of how long they have to wait for service. In practice, however, Web servers reject requests when they are overloaded. For simplicity, let us assume that a server rejects requests whenever all service channels are occupied and then these requests disappear from the system. In this case, the fraction of rejected requests is completely independent of the service time distribution. In other words, there is no difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous traffic under this service model. In fact, the fraction of rejected requests can be derived from the Erlang loss formula, see, e.g., [8, 9] . We obtain the following cost function family F N >0 for servers that can open up to b channels simultaneously:
On the first glance, the family of Erlang loss functions makes an innocent impression. Indeed, these functions are continuous, convex, monotonically increasing in λ and f b (λ) ≤ 1/b, for every λ ≥ 0. (Hence R * = 1.) Nevertheless, the following corollary shows that the coordination ratio R for integral assignments is unbounded. Thus, the limit of these functions behaves in a very extreme way at x = 1, where the cost suddenly increases by an unbounded factor. This implies that α = ∞. In contrast to the monotone queueing functions from Section 3.1, however, the source of the troubles is not an ∞-pole, but the rapid increase from cost
or in other words, the rapid increase from tiny to small cost. Hence, one might hope that the absolute cost of selfish routing under the Erlang loss cost function family is small. In fact, this is confirmed by the following theorem. packets. Taking into account that typical Web servers can open several hundred TCP connections simultaneously, so that b m can be assumed to be quite large, we conclude that the cost of selfish routing is very small in absolute terms, even though the coordination ratio comparing this cost with the optimal cost is unbounded.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present the first thorough theoretical study of the price of selfish routing in server farms for general cost function. In our investigations we paid special attention on cost functions from Queueing Theory. Our results have some important algorithmic consequences in these models. They show that the choice of the queueing discipline should take into account the possible performance degradation due to selfish and uncoordinated behavior of network users.
We have shown that the coordination ratio for queueing systems without rejection is unbounded. The same is true for server farms that reject requests in case of overload. However, there is a fundamental difference between these two kinds of queueing policies. Because of the infinity pole, the delay under selfish routing in the queuing systems without rejection is in general unbounded. In fact, we have explicitly shown that the selfish routing in such queueing systems can lead to an arbitrary large delay even when the total injected load can potentially be served by a single server. In contrast, the fraction of rejected requests under selfish routing can be bounded above by a function that is exponentially small in the number of TCP connections that can be opened simultaneously.
We conclude that server farms that serve all requests, regardless of how long requests have to wait, cannot give any reasonable guarantee on the quality of service when selfish agents manage the traffic. However, if requests are allowed to be rejected, then it is possible to guarantee a high quality of service for every individual request stream. Thus, the typical practice of rejecting requests in case of overload is a necessary condition to ensure efficient service under game theoretic measures.
under an optimal fractional allocation, i.e., an allocation with minimum maximum cost over all servers assuming that streams can be split arbitrarily. Without loss of generality, we assume that server 1 has the maximum load over all servers, and hence X ≤ m x. (Recall that since server 1 is the server with the biggest bandwidth and each function f b ∈ F B is nondecreasing in λ and nonincreasing in b, there exists an optimal fractional allocation with maximum load for server 1.) In this way, 
As a consequence,
which completes the proof of Lemma 14.
Now, we prove a sufficient condition for an unbounded coordination ratio. Observe that the negation of the property gives the sufficient condition for a bounded coordination ratio as specified in Theorem 2. 
Then, for every Γ ≥ 1, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium over -small streams with cost C > Γ · opt.
PROOF. First, let us show that the above property of the function f implies that
Indeed, if we consider the negations of the two statements then we observe that ∃α ≥ 1,
, e.g., we can set α = α 1/ log(1+β) . Now, consider a server farm with two identical servers, each with the same monotone cost function f satisfying condition (1) . For the purpose of contradiction, assume there exists Γ with C ≤ Γ · opt for every Nash equilibrium over streams of maximum weight . Therefore, by (1), there exists λ > 0 with f ((1 + /10) λ) > Γ · f (λ). Using this assumption, we will define a Nash equilibrium over streams of maximum weight > 0 with cost C > Γ · opt.
First, let us consider streams of identical weight w ∈ [λ /2, λ ] and assign them to the servers so that the cost on each server is exactly f (λ). Let τ be the number of streams per server in this allocation. Now, let us slightly change the instance by taking two streams, one from each server, and "break" each of them into two smaller streams, one of weight 3 5 w, the other of weight 2 5 w. It is easy to see that the optimal allocation for this instance has cost opt = f (λ).
Let us consider a different allocations of the streams to the servers. We assign τ − 1 streams of weight w and two streams of weight 3 5 w to the first server and the remaining streams to the second server. In this way, the first server has cost f (λ+ 1 5 w) whereas the second server has cost f (λ − 1 5 w). This allocation defines a Nash equilibrium, because the streams have minimum weight 2 5 w and therefore there is no incentive for any of them to change its strategy. The cost of this Nash equilibrium, however, is
Clearly this contradicts our initial assumption that C ≤ Γ · opt for any Nash equilibrium over streams of maximum weight . This completes the proof of Lemma 15.
Theorems 2 and 4 follow immediately from Lemmas 14 and 15.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Let n be the number of streams and let α = m n−1 . Assume, that n is such that Let us fix a server j. The probability that all the data streams are assigned to server j is Π i p We want to show that if C ≤ opt Γ then Γ ≥ m. We proceed by contradiction and let us assume there is Γ such that C ≤ opt Γ and Γ < m. Then, we obtain
where the last inequality follows by observing that the value of opt Γ is at most the value of a solution in which we assign n m (we can assume that n m is a positive integer) data streams to each server, after blowing up each data stream by Γ. Then, we obtain ≤ . The last inequality is true by the choice of n, and so our data streams are -small.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Fix a monotone family F B = {f b |b ∈ B} of cost functions. First let us show that the coordination ratio under average-cost objective, denoted by Σ, for this family is bounded if the coordination ratio R is bounded. Clearly, if R is bounded then we obtain from Theorem 2 ∃α ≥ 1 ∀b ∈ B ∀λ > 0 f b (2λ) ≤ αf b (λ) .
We will show that Σ is bounded provided this property is given. Fix any Nash equilibrium with probabilities p j i , i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]. We have to give an upper bound on the ratio between the expected total latency given by the probabilities p j i , on one hand, and the optimal total latency, on the other hand. Let w = w 1 , . . . , w m denote a vector of random variables with w j describing the injected load of server j. Let w * denote a corresponding load vector of an optimal allocation that minimizes the total latency. We have to show that there exists Γ ≥ 1 such that Therefore, with probability m −n , the cost on a particular server j is at least f b (b−δ), and thus also max j∈ [m] C j is at least f b (b−δ). Additionally, the random events corresponding to different servers are pairwise disjoint. Using these observations we obtain
We want to show that if C ≤ OP T Γ , then Γ ≥ m. Assume towards a contradiction that C ≤ OP T Γ and Γ < m. Then we have
